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Shale Gas and  
Clean Energy Policy 
Joseph P. Tomain † 
“America needs a new political discourse on energy. This would 
recognize the emerging reality that the United States has turned 
around as an energy producer and is on a major upswing. And 
the impact will be measured not just in energy security and the 
balance of payments. Energy development also turns out to be 
an engine for job creation and economic growth—something 
that would hardly have been considered the last time we were 
electing a president.” * 
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Introduction 
A recent report from the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
makes claims similar to those expressed by Daniel Yergin. Both 
commentators argue that new fossil fuel discoveries in the United 
States are having a profound impact on domestic and global energy 
policies. According to the IEA, “[t]he global energy map is changing” 
and “is being redrawn by the resurgence in oil and gas production in 
the United States.”1 Industry observers project that by 2020, the  
† Dean Emeritus and the Wilbert & Helen Ziegler Professor of Law 
University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
* Daniel Yergin, America’s New Energy Reality, N.Y. Times, June 10, 
2012, at SR9. Yergin argues that the increase in fossil fuel discoveries 
(particularly natural gas from shale formations), lower demand for 
imported oil, an increase in domestic oil production, and technological 
developments have “improved” our fossil fuel picture and that we are 
making gains toward “energy independence” while “rebalancing world oil.” 
Further, he argues that oil and gas should be seen as an “engine of 
economic growth.” 
1. Int’l Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012: Executive 
Summary 1 (2012). 
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United States will produce more oil than Saudi Arabia and more 
natural gas than Russia.2 In addition, the IEA reports that the global 
energy map is changing as countries retreat from nuclear power and 
replace it with rapidly growing wind and solar technologies.3 Other 
commentators, like Professor Richard Pierce, claim that shale gas 
addresses all of our major energy problems,4 while still others treat 
this natural gas resource as a bridge fuel to the future.5 Indeed, in his 
2012 State of the Union Address, President Obama cited experts who 
predicted that the natural gas industry will create 600,000 jobs by the 
end of the decade.6 As remarkable as these claims are, the United 
States is not scheduled to be energy independent without a robust 
clean energy economy, even in the brightest projections.7 
To be sure, these new finds of natural gas have much to 
recommend them. First, recent discoveries reveal abundant reserves 
and, following abundance, consumers enjoy lower natural gas prices.8 
Second, natural gas emits about half of the carbon dioxide released by 
coal. As a result of these lower prices and less drastic environmental 
effects, natural gas is beginning to displace coal for electricity 
generation.9 Fourth, the increase in domestic production adds jobs to 
 
2. See Michael Levi, Think Again: The American Energy Boom, Foreign 
Pol’y, July–Aug. 2012, at 55, 55 (noting industry predictions that “by 
2020, the United States will become the world’s largest producer of oil 
and gas”).  
3. International Energy Agency, supra note 1, at 6 (projecting an 
increase in the use of renewables as the role of nuclear power declines). 
4. Richard J. Peirce, Jr., Natural Gas Fracking Addresses All of Our 
Major Problems, J. Energy & Envtl. L. (forthcoming May 2013) 
(manuscript at 3–5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2172441. 
5. Stephen P.A. Brown et al., Res. for the Future & Nat’l 
Energy Pol’y Inst., Natural Gas: A Bridge to a Low-Carbon 
Future? 2 (2009); John D. Podesta & Timothy E. Wirth, Ctr. for 
Am. Progress & Energy Future Coal., Natural Gas: A Bridge 
Fuel for the 21st Century 1 (2009).  
6. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the 
Union Address (January 24, 2012). 
7. Levi, supra note 2, at 56. 
8. Stephen P.A. Brown et al., Resources for the Future, Abundant 
Shale Gas Resources: Some Implications for Energy Policy 11 
(2010). 
9. See John Corrigan & Jim Hendrickson, Shale vs. Coal, Pub. Util. 
Fort., May 2012, at 20, 21 (noting that the “emergence of ample 
supplies of natural gas at moderate to low prices and the prospect of 
more stringent air emissions regulations” is likely to result in “a 
moderate, but uneven, shift from older, coal-fired plants to more 
efficient gas-fired plants”). 
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the economy.10 Fifth, the United States is beginning to reduce imports 
and increase exports, thus reducing the trade deficit as the United 
States grows more energy independent.11 Not only are we less reliant 
on imports, natural gas can be adopted for use in the transportation 
sector—further reducing our reliance on oil.12 And, sixth, new 
discoveries have the effect of smoothing out the price volatility 
experienced by the natural gas sector for the last two decades.13 
There is other good news for the U.S. energy economy. In addition 
to developing our own resources, U.S. energy consumption has been 
declining in recent years. According to Worldwatch Institute measure-
ments, energy use in 2012 was 7% below the 2007 level and that decline 
constituted the steepest five-year decrease in approximately sixty 
years.14 Additionally, renewable resources, particularly wind, are 
increasing their share of the country’s energy portfolio. Most notably, we 
are beginning to witness a decline in carbon dioxide emissions as well as 
reductions in other greenhouse gas emissions such as sulfur dioxide.15 
But open questions remain. If we look behind the numbers on 
energy consumption, how much of that declining consumption is 
attributable to increases in energy efficiency and how much is 
attributable to a poor economy? If we look more closely at shale gas 
production, particularly when we consider hydraulic fracturing, what 
environmental costs are associated with developing this domestic 
resource? And, from a broader perspective, what role should natural 
 
10. See Michael Greenstone & Adam Looney, The Role of Oil and Gas in 
Driving Job Growth, Brookings (June 1, 2012, 8:23 AM), http:// 
www.brookings.edu/blogs/jobs/posts/2012/06/01-jobs-greenstone-looney 
(“Between 2007 and 2011, employment in oil and gas extraction 
increased by 28,000.”). 
11. See Editorial, Natural-Gas Exports Could Lift U.S. Trade and Economy, 
Bloomberg (Nov. 25, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-11-25/natural-gas-exports-could-lift-u-s-trade-and-economy.html 
(“Liquid natural gas exports could add billions to the U.S. economy, create 
tens of thousands of long-term jobs and help narrow the trade gap.”). 
12. Peter Orszag, Natural-Gas Cars Can Drive Us Toward a Better 
Economy, Bloomberg (June 26, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloom 
berg.com/news/2012-06-26/natural-gas-cars-can-drive-us-toward-a-better-e 
conomy.html; Floyd Norris, Natural Gas for Vehicles Could Use U.S. 
Support, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2012, at B1. 
13. See Natural Gas: U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, U.S. Energy Info. 
Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9 
190us3m.htm (last updated Feb. 28, 2013) (providing monthly statistical 
evidence of sharp changes in the wellhead price of U.S. natural gas). 
14. Chris Flavin, Transforming U.S. Energy: The 2012 Story the Media 
Missed, Revolt (Jan. 16, 2013) http://blogs.worldwatch.org/revolt/tra 
nsforming-u-s-energy-the-2012-story-the-media-missed.  
15. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Environment, Monthly 
Energy Rev., Dec. 21, 2012, at 157, 158.  
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gas, including shale gas, play in the country’s clean energy future? 
Will we continue to favor fossil-fuel incumbents at the expense of new 
entrants in renewable resources and energy efficiency?16  
This Article will address these questions by first describing the 
clean energy transition in Parts I–III. Next, in Part IV, the Article 
will describe the role of natural gas and shale gas in our contemporary 
energy picture. Finally, in Part V, the Article will identify some of the 
costs attributable to shale gas production, including the possibility 
that our current focus on shale gas will simply result in a new 
hydrocarbon future at the expense of a vibrant and productive clean 
energy economy. The Article concludes in Part VI with some 
recommendations for future shale gas regulation. While acknowledging 
the reality that shale gas will play an increasingly larger role in our 
energy portfolio, the Article argues that natural gas should not be 
considered a clean energy resource. 
I. Clean Energy Transition  
The transition from a fossil fuel economy to a clean energy 
economy will be socially, economically, and politically transformative. 
To accomplish that transformation, innovations in policy and 
regulation, markets and business practices, and technology policy and 
its implementation will be necessary. In Ending Dirty Energy Policy, I 
argued that over the last generation, the United States has developed 
a policy consensus in favor of clean energy.17 In short, we cannot 
effectively address climate change nor can we become more energy 
secure until we transform our energy policy away from fossil fuels to 
clean energy. Further, a sound business argument can be made for 
developing a clean energy economy on its own without necessarily 
tying it to climate-change initiatives. Clearly, clean energy and 
climate change are complementary policies; nevertheless, the United 
States should proceed with a clean energy transition now rather than 
wait for reluctant federal leadership on the climate front. 
 
16. Although this Article concentrates on natural gas, the United States is 
also experiencing increased oil production, often from geologically 
difficult formations that require technological advances in exploration 
and drilling. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Vast Oil Reserve May Now Be 
Within Reach, and Battle Heats Up, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2013, at A9 
(“For decades, oilmen have been unable to extricate the Monterey 
Shale’s crude because of its complex geological formation, which makes 
extraction quite expensive. But as the oil industry’s technological 
advances succeed in unlocking oi1 from increasingly difficult locations, 
there is heady talk that California could be in store for a new oil 
boom.”); Chip Brown, North Dakota Went Boom, N.Y. Times Mag., 
Feb. 3, 2013, at 22. 
17. Joseph P. Tomain, Ending Dirty Energy Policy: Prelude to 
Climate Change (2011). 
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Today, it is also the case that public opinion favors a clean energy 
policy.18 I further argued that a clean energy consensus is being 
developed from the bottom-up rather than through top-down 
leadership at the federal level—despite the clean energy initiatives of 
the Obama administration.19 In other words, although federal 
leadership is lacking,20 clean energy activities at the state, regional, 
and local levels—as well as investment activities in the private 
sector—are pursuing a clean energy agenda.21 As an aside, we have 
yet to develop a more complete clean energy politics and that is a 
matter that needs to be addressed.22 Now, due to the increasing use of 
 
18. Justin Gillis, Willing to Pay (a Little) More for Clean Energy, N.Y. 
Times Green (May 14, 2012, 7:57 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2012/05/14/willing-to-pay-a-little-for-clean-energy; News Release, 
Nuclear Energy Inst., Public Opinion Survey Shows Overwhelming 
Support for Clean Energy Loan Guarantees (Feb. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/news-releases/public-opinion-survey-sh 
ows-overwhelming-support-f; Ruy Teixeira, Public Opinion Snapshot: 
Strong Support for Clean-Energy Economy, Ctr. for Am. Progress 
(Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/public-opinion/ 
news/2009/03/30/5810/public-opinion-snapshot-strong-support-for-clean-en 
ergy-economy.  
19. The Obama Administration has, through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (commonly referred to as the Stimulus Bill), Pub. L. 
No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009), and other initiatives, significantly 
increased clean energy research and development, negotiated higher 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) standards with car manu-
facturers and the United Automobile Workers (“UAW”) to reach 54.5 
miles per gallon by 2025, and set higher ozone and mercury standards for 
power plants. Juliet Eilperin, U.S., Auto Industry Agree on Long-Range 
Fuel Efficiency Rules, Wash. Post, July 28, 2011, at A17; Colleen 
Curtis, President Obama Announces New Fuel Economy Standards, 
White House Blog (July 29, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ 
2011/07/29/president-obama-announces-new-fuel-economy-standards; see 
also News Release, EPA, EPA Issues First National Standards for 
Mercury Pollution from Power Plants (Dec. 21, 2011), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400
c27/bd8b3f37edf5716d8525796d005dd086!opendocument (estimating that 
the new rules will prevent up to 46,000 premature deaths and 540,000 
asthma attacks among children). 
20. See Justin Gillis, Politics Slows Climate Study, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 
2011, at A1. 
21. Investments in a clean energy transition continue to increase. See REN21, 
Renewables 2012: Global Status Report 15 (2012) (“Global new 
investment in renewables rose 17% to a record USD 257 billion in 2011. 
This was more than six times the figure for 2004 and almost twice the 
total investment in 2007, the last year before the acute phase of the 
recent global financial crisis.”).  
22. Anthony Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change 1–10 (2d ed., 
rev. and updated 2011). I will address this issue in Joseph P. Tomain, 
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natural gas in general, and shale gas in particular, the timely question 
is: What role should natural gas play in the clean energy transition? 
This Article will address that issue.  
It can and has been argued that a transition to clean energy is 
necessary if the country is to formally address climate change. But the 
converse is not true—a transition to clean energy is not dependent 
upon addressing climate change.23 Instead, a clean energy economy is 
independently valuable. While the business and economic case for 
clean energy is sound,24 barriers to this transition exist. For any 
regulatory program to gain traction and become implemented in the 
United States, it is necessary that a proposed program have a policy 
basis, a proper set of regulatory and legal tools, and political 
support.25 As noted, there is ample policy support for a full-scale clean 
energy policy.26 Nevertheless, legal and political challenges remain, 
including the matter of how to treat natural gas. 
 
Clean Energy Politics: The Necessity of Innovation 
(forthcoming 2014). 
23. But see James Gustave Speth, The 10th Annual John H. Chafee 
Memorial Lecture, A New American Environmentalism and the New 
Economy (Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Speth, New American Environ-
mentalism], available at http://neweconomicsinstitute.org/publication 
ns/lectures/speth/gus/a-new-american-environmentalism (arguing that a 
green economy is not enough); see also James Gustave Speth, Thirtieth 
Annual E.F. Schumacher Lectures, Letter to Liberals: Liberalism, 
Environmentalism, and Economic Growth (Nov. 20, 2010), available at 
http://neweconomicsinstitute.org/publications/letter-liberals-liberalism-
environmentalism-and-economic-growth; James Gustave Speth, Off the 
Pedestal: Creating a New Vision of Economic Growth, Yale 
Envtl. 360 (May 31, 2011), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/ 
off_the_pedestal_creating_a_new_vision_of_economic_growth/2409/; 
James Gustave Speth, Towards a New Economy and a New Politics, 
Solutions J., May 2010, at 33. 
24. See Ron Pernick et al., Clean Energy Trends 2010, at 2 (2010), 
available at http://info.cleanenergyeducation.net/pdf/Trends2010.pdf 
(noting that “[c]lean energy has become a driving force for economic 
recovery”); see also Bill Clinton, Back to Work: Why We Need 
Smart Government for a Strong Economy 139–69 (2011) 
(describing the economic benefits that an investment in clean energy 
will bring). 
25. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Regulatory Law 
and Policy 3 (3d ed. 2003) (“The making of regulatory policy in 
American government is influenced by politics, policy considerations and 
legal constraints.”); Joseph P. Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing 
Government Regulation, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 377, 386 (1997) 
(“[R]egulation in the legislative arena is the product of the interaction of 
politics, policy, and law.”). 
26. See Tomain, Ending Dirty Energy Policy, supra note 17, at 92–120 
(describing the targets of and need for clean energy policy). 
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The legal challenges reside, first, in a body of law that has served 
the country well for most of the twentieth century by building a 
national energy infrastructure and by providing reliable and relatively 
inexpensive energy to fuel economic growth. Second, and 
unfortunately, the dominant energy model came with significant 
costs—it ignored environmental harms and constrained energy 
markets. And, third, the traditional model favored particular actors 
and sustained, through laws and regulations, a narrow industrial 
structure. Quite simply, large fossil fuel firms dominated, and 
continue to dominate,27 our energy economy, thus retarding the 
development of new energy markets and a more competitive energy 
economy. Shale gas, then, will most likely have the effect of further 
strengthening our traditional hydrocarbon economy while threatening 
the growth of the clean energy sector. 
A clean energy program must also confront multiple political 
challenges. Here two are highlighted. The political challenges, 
unsurprisingly, are consistent with and connected to the laws and 
regulations already in place. Those laws and regulations were shaped 
by and have given fossil fuel incumbents significant and continuing 
political power.28 Even though I argue that clean energy enjoys broad 
 
27. See Editorial, Big Coal’s Bidding, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2011, at A22 
(noting that “it will likely take another disaster before lawmakers will 
be willing to buck Big Coal and pass desperately needed safety 
legislation”).  
28. Regarding the current political economy vis-à-vis the environment: 
The first step in building a green economy is to ask why the 
current system is so destructive. As I describe in The Bridge at 
the Edge of the World, the answer lies in the defining features of 
our current political economy. An unquestioning society-wide 
commitment to economic growth at almost any cost; powerful 
corporate interests whose overriding objective is to grow by 
generating profit, including profit from avoiding the environ-
mental costs they create and from replicating technologies 
designed with little regard for the environment; markets that 
systematically fail to recognize environmental costs unless 
corrected by government; government that is subservient to 
corporate interests and the growth imperative; rampant consum-
erism spurred endlessly by sophisticated advertising; economic 
activity now so large in scale that its impacts alter the 
fundamental biophysical operations of the planet—all these 
combine to deliver an ever-growing world economy that is 
undermining the ability of the planet to sustain life. These are key 
issues—these issues that are more systemic—that must be 
addressed by our new environmentalism. 
 Speth, New American Environmentalism, supra note 23 (referencing 
James Gustave Speth, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: 
Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to 
Sustainability (2008) [hereinafter Speth, The Bridge]). 
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political support, incumbency hinders transition efforts. The first 
political challenge, then, is to overcome the power and influence of 
fossil fuel incumbency. Simply put, increased oil and gas production 
empowers incumbents. Second, although public opinion favors clean 
energy, public opinion is less supportive of climate change legislation. 
More problematically, federal legislators show no interest in 
introducing climate change legislation despite President Obama’s 
recognition of the necessity to “roll back the specter of a warming 
planet” in his Second Inaugural Address.29 One danger for clean 
energy advocates, then, is that the politics of clean energy run the 
risk of getting entangled in and confused with climate change 
initiatives, thus impeding the energy transition.30 Any confusion 
between clean energy and climate change can be dispelled by making 
the case that economic growth will accompany a clean energy agenda 
while the relationship between economic growth and climate change is 
currently contested.31 Although shale gas may help the economy for 
the time being, it is not responsive to the challenges of climate 
change. For that reason, and for others addressed immediately below, 
while shale gas is a cleaner burning fossil fuel than coal, it is not a 
clean energy resource. 
II. Defining Clean Energy 
There are significant reasons for and consequences attached to 
labeling a resource, such as shale gas, a clean energy resource. 
Although clean energy is generally understood to encompass a greater 
use of renewable resources and to capture increased gains from energy 
efficiency,32 it is necessary to more precisely identify those resources 
that constitute a clean energy portfolio for several reasons. First, 
simply as a matter of interest-group politics, the correct naming and 
framing of policy issues is necessary. Second, it must be noted, and 
emphasized, that sound clean energy politics is not inimical to 
 
29. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009).  
30. See, e.g., Naomi Klein, Capitalism vs. The Climate, The Nation, Nov. 
28, 2011, at 11, 12 (noting that, from 2007 to 2011, there was an abrupt 
downward shift in the percentage of Americans who believed that “the 
continued burning of fossil fuels would cause the climate to change”). 
31. See Speth, The Bridge, supra note 28, at 89–107 (2008) (describing 
the potential major contributions of environmental economics). 
32. See The Law of Clean Energy: Efficiency and Renewables 1–18 
(Michael B. Gerrard, ed., 2011) (describing the role of energy efficiency 
and renewable resources in creating clean energy); Amory Lovins, 
Rocky Mountain Inst., Reinventing Fire: Bold Business 
Solutions for the New Energy Era xiii (2011) (“[Clean energy] 
combines two elements: it uses energy very efficiently, and it gets that 
energy from diverse and mainly dispersed renewable sources.”). 
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economic growth; instead, clean energy is necessary for a vibrant 
economic future.33 Third, and correlatively, a clear definition will 
enable policymakers and analysts to more accurately define the 
metrics and set the goals needed to measure the gains in an emerging 
clean energy economy. And, fourth, defining clean energy has direct 
legal consequences. Once a resource, such as solar or wind power, is 
defined as a clean energy resource, then it can qualify for particular 
regulatory treatment or for government subsidies, as examples.  
Currently, the definition of clean energy differs according to 
particular applications.34 As states move forward and establish 
renewable portfolio standards (RPS), for example, the resources that 
qualify under those standards differ from state to state. Some states 
include nuclear power while others exclude it. Another open issue is 
whether to include “clean coal” in an RPS program. Indeed, in 
contrast to RPS programs, electricity advocates favor clean energy 
standards (CES) that explicitly include clean coal and nuclear power 
as central to their definition of clean energy.35 Another unresolved 
issue is whether or not RPS or CES programs should be rationalized 
across the country or if states should be free to use distinct definitions 
in order to take advantage of differences in regional energy resources.36  
 
33. See Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the 
Remaking of the Modern World 4 (2011) (noting that oil, coal, and 
natural gas alone are unlikely to meet the world’s increasing demand for 
energy); Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Price of Civilization: 
Reawakening American Virtue and Prosperity 201–04 (2011) 
(arguing for a pathway to a self-financing clean energy system); 
Thomas L. Friedman & Michael Mandelbaum, That Used to Be 
Us: How America Fell Behind in the World it Invented and 
How We Can Come Back 199–211 (2011) (describing how a clean 
energy policy can make America “healthier, more prosperous, more 
secure, and more resilient”). 
34. The clean energy economy has also been characterized as “sustainable 
capitalism,” defined as “a framework that seeks to maximize long-term 
economic value by reforming markets to address real needs while 
integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) metrics 
throughout the decision-making process.” Al Gore & David Blood, A 
Manifesto for Sustainable Capitalism, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 2011, at 
A21 (arguing that longer-term thinking about investments according to 
ESG metrics will: (1) develop sustainable products and services for 
longer term profits; (2) reduce waste and increase energy efficiency; (3) 
increase the effectiveness of risk management by, for example, more 
efficient compliance practices; and, (4) lower the cost of debt). 
35. See Ctr. for Climate and Energy Solutions & Reg. Assistance 
Project, Clean Energy Standards: State and Federal Policy 
Options and Implications 1 (Nov. 2011). 
36. Compare Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a 
National RPS, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1339, 1339 (2010) (favoring national 
standards), with Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a 
National Renewable Electricity Requirement, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 361, 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Shale Gas and Clean Energy Policy 
1196 
Clean energy, then, must be clearly defined. The most 
problematic energy resource in this regard remains nuclear power. 
Nuclear power generation, of course, emits no carbon dioxide, yet the 
carbon footprint for the entire nuclear fuel cycle is not completely 
carbon neutral.37 Regardless of its carbon footprint, however, nuclear 
power is the quintessential example of a traditional energy form in 
that it is large scale, centralized, and capital intensive. Further, the 
industry would not exist without government support.38 The 
argument, then, can be made that nuclear power should not be 
considered an environmentally friendly, clean resource because it fits 
so comfortably within the hard-path paradigm. Still, the issue of 
whether nuclear power should be considered a clean energy resource 
remains contentious. 
Similar challenges attend shale gas. Although shale gas emits less 
carbon than coal, it is still a dirty resource. Further, shale gas is 
underpriced—even given its current abundance—because the cost of 
carbon is not included in the cost. Shale gas, then, is simply an 
extension of our traditional hydrocarbon economy, favored by 
government for over a century. 
Although clean energy constitutes approximately 9% of today’s 
U.S. fossil fuel economy, it is making notable gains.39 Renewable 
resources, particularly wind power, are outstripping the installation of 
new fossil fuel electricity generation.40 Further, energy efficiency is 
increasing notably, and the costs of solar and wind resources are 
decreasing.41 Even though clean energy is not currently cost 
competitive and enjoys government subsidies, no energy resource 
operates in unfettered competitive markets. Clean energy gains must 
 
361 (disfavoring a national RPS); see also David B. Spence, Federalism, 
Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 431, 507 (2013) (arguing that the federal government should 
“restrict its regulation of fracking to those aspects of the industry that 
produce inter-state effects or implicate established national interests”). 
37. See generally Amory B. Lovins, Renewable Energy’s “Footprint” Myth, 
24 Elec. J. 40 (2011) (comparing the land-use footprint of renewable 
electricity with that of nuclear power and finding that nuclear power 
requires more land). 
38. Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 
221, 227 (2005). 
39. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Annual 
Energy Review 2011, at 6, 278 (2012).  
40. See Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Wind Energy Update 8 (Jan. 
2012) (illustrating how new wind energy capacity increases outpaced fossil 
fuel capacity increases for three of the four years from 2007 to 2010). 
41. See Int’l Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook ch. 9 (2010) 
(positing that short-term government support for renewable energy is 
necessary to ensure long-term cost competitiveness with fossil fuels). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Shale Gas and Clean Energy Policy 
1197 
be tracked and reliable metrics must be established to fully 
understand the dollar value of investments in clean energy and the 
corresponding reductions in greenhouse gases, particularly carbon 
dioxide. Here lies the rub: although pricing carbon is notoriously 
difficult,42 the failure to account for this harmful externality caused by 
shale gas in the price of electricity leads directly to underpricing the 
resource and over consuming it, to the direct detriment of the 
environment and human health. 
III. The Political Economy of Clean Energy  
In addition to identifying the resources that satisfy the definition 
of clean energy, the assumptions behind a clean energy policy must be 
articulated with equal clarity. Identifying the policy assumptions 
behind a clean energy economy will distinguish the new economy from 
traditional energy firms and markets and will have a direct impact on 
how shale gas is perceived and regulated. The clean energy 
assumptions, in turn, will signal the structure and design of clean 
energy firms and markets. First enunciated by Amory Lovins in his 
book Soft Energy Paths,43 a clean, or smart, energy economy is in 
many ways the diametric opposite of our traditional and current 
energy system. 
It is fundamental that energy is valued as a primary input into 
the economy. This proposition is more nuanced than may first appear. 
Energy is a more important input for developing economies than for 
developed ones.44 Further, depending on the amount of fossil fuels in 
 
42. See Frank Ackerman & Elizabeth A. Stanton, The Social Cost of 
Carbon, Real-World Econ. Rev., June 26, 2010, at 129, 129 (“Any 
estimate of the [social cost of carbon] rests on a number of value 
judgments and predictions about uncertain future events.”); Philip Q. 
Hanser & Mariko Geronimo, What Price, GHGs?: Calculating the Implied 
Value of CO2 Abatement in Green Energy Policies, Pub. Util. Fort., 
Oct. 2012, at 12, 12 (“No [calculation] mechanism is necessarily right or 
wrong: each is designed to address region- or state-specific concerns that 
sometimes go beyond CO2 abatement.”); Warwick J. McKibbin et 
al., Brookings, Pricing Carbon in the United States: A Model-
Based Analysis of Power Sector Only Approaches (2012) 
(examining the merits of various cap-and-trade calculation approaches). 
43. Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable 
Peace 4 (1977) (“The basic tenet of high-energy projections is that the 
more energy we use, the better off we are. But how much energy we use 
to accomplish our social goals could instead be considered a measure less 
of our success than of our failure.”). 
44. See Catherine A. O’Neill & Cass R. Sunstein, Economics and the 
Environment: Trading Debt and Technology for Nature, 17 Colum. J. 
Envtl. L. 93, 96–98 (1992) (discussing potential solutions for indus-
trialized nations to encourage sustainable growth in developing nations).  
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the energy mix, energy can become an economic drag.45 Notably, in 
the United States, as a matter of historic policy, we have constructed 
an economy that requires energy that must be relatively cheap, 
reliable, available on demand, and central to economic growth. For 
most of the twentieth century, those parameters dictated that oil, 
natural gas, and coal form the basis of our energy economy. Thus, 
dirty energy has been buoyed by public policy and government 
support, and cheap fossil fuel energy has been treated as a public 
good, creating a much-relied-upon consumer expectation that energy 
prices will remain low and energy will remain abundant. 
Similarly, the commercial nuclear power industry was the creation 
of government and cannot exist without its life-sustaining public 
financial support.46 In other words, nuclear power and fossil fuel 
resources do not compete in truly competitive markets. Instead, they 
benefit from a system of legal regulations and institutions, which have 
fostered and continue to sustain their development and expansion.47 
No longer should these resources receive such favored treatment. The 
social costs of dirty energy are too high and the opportunity to pursue 
clean energy should not be squandered. 
Further, traditional U.S. energy policy generated an identifiable 
model with specific industrial characteristics, which has been 
criticized as unsuitable for continuing to meet the nation’s long-term 
energy demands.48 Most notably, traditional energy firms are national 
 
45. See generally Joseph P. Tomain, To a Point, 52 Loy. L. Rev. 1201 
(2006) (assessing the societal and economic costs of climate change 
resulting from excessive fossil fuel use). 
46. See Amory B. Lovins & Imran Sheikh, Rocky Mountain Inst., The 
Nuclear Illusion 1 (2008) (arguing that nuclear power is “grossly 
uncompetitive”); Doug Koplow, Union of Concerned Scientists, 
Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable Without Subsidies 1 (2011) 
(arguing that taxpayer subsidies “enabled the nation’s existing [nuclear] 
reactors to be built . . . [and] supported their operation for decades”). 
47. See Matthew L. Wald, Approval of Reactor Design Clears Path for New 
Plants, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2011, at B6 (illustrating streamlined 
administrative regulations and loan programs initiated by Congress to 
offset nuclear power’s competitive deficiencies). 
48. See Tomain, Ending Dirty Energy Policy, supra note 17, at 65–91 
(tracing the evolution of energy policy to encompass notions of 
conservation); Michael J. Graetz, The End of Energy: The 
Unmaking of America’s Environment, Security and Independence 
(2011) (examining the relationship between continued reliance on fossil 
fuels and national stability); Lincoln Davies, Alternative Energy and the 
Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 Idaho L. Rev. 473 (2010) 
(examining the disjunction between traditional energy regulation and 
environmental regulation); David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The 
Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market 
Power, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 131 (2012) (arguing that the “manipulation and 
deceit” emphasis of securities law makes it a poor model for protection 
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in scope, large scale, capital intensive, and highly centralized.49 In the 
areas of electricity and natural gas, moreover, they operate as regional 
monopolies.50 A clean energy economy will look dramatically different. 
Most prominently, it will not be fossil fuel based. Secondarily, a clean 
energy economy will be decentralized and scaled to task. In the words 
of Amory Lovins, using nuclear power to boil water is “like cutting 
butter with a chainsaw.”51 Therefore, as an example of smarter and 
smaller-scale energy sources, a clean energy economy would substitute 
distributed electricity generation for nuclear behemoths. Distributed 
generation is closer to end users, can relieve stress from an 
overburdened transmission grid, will increase energy efficiency, and 
can make better use of local renewable resources rather than 
continuing to rely upon large-scale fossil fuels like shale gas.52 
Third, a clean energy market will be structured differently than 
existing energy markets. The traditional energy market has been 
dominated by a handful of large firms that exercise their competitive 
advantage as incumbents to keep out new entrants. Clean energy 
providers, such as solar, wind, distributed generation, and energy 
efficient appliance producers, all threaten to reduce the market share 
of fossil fuel incumbents. Firms and markets in a clean energy 
economy will be smaller, more numerous, and more competitive than 
those in the existing energy economy. Thus, these new entrants 
promise to open new energy markets, increase competition, increase 
consumer choice, and promote technological innovation.  
Additionally, while traditional energy markets were regional and 
national in scope, a clean energy economy will be both local and 
global. At the global level, for example, the European Union is 
actively promoting clean energy initiatives.53 It has established a 
 
against the market power problems that energy regulation presents); 
David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 
Cornell L. Rev. 765 (2008) (pointing out the difficulties energy markets 
have experience in transitioning from a regulatory-based model to a 
market-based model). 
49. Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy 
Policy, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 355, 375–76 (1990) [hereinafter Tomain, 
The Dominant Model]; see also Spence & Prentice, supra note 48, at 149 
(providing a helpful chart of industry-specific characteristics). 
50. Davies, supra note 48, at 482; Spence & Prentice, supra note 48, at 148. 
51. Amory Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?, 55 Foreign 
Aff. 65, 79 (1976). 
52. See Melissa Powers, Small is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy 
Policies to Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 Wisc. 
Int’l L.J. (forthcoming 2013). 
53. See generally European Climate Foundation, Roadmap 2050: A 
Practical Guide to a Prosperous, Low-Carbon Europe (Apr. 
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technical regime for the expansion of the smart grid. Indeed, the vast 
majority of households in Italy have had smart meters installed to 
reduce the cost of electricity.54 As another example, Germany is 
scheduled to decommission all of its nuclear power and has adopted 
rules promoting renewable resources to generate electricity.55 On the 
other side of the globe, China is the world leader in the development 
of commercial solar and wind technologies,56 and India is ramping up 
its solar capacity as an alternative to coal-fired electricity.57 At the 
local level, smaller-scale power production, new energy-saving 
buildings and appliances, smarter meters and controls, and consumer 
energy audits will have the effect of increasing consumer choice 
through increased competition. 
All of these efforts have two direct effects on U.S. clean energy 
development. First, the experiences of other countries provide us with 
valuable information that has the effect of reducing the slope of the 
learning curve for further clean energy development and 
implementation. Second, more clean energy technologies and products 
will be increasingly traded in global and local markets. Whereas the 
traditional energy economy was decidedly national, clean energy 
stretches the borders of energy markets and can operate at the local 
scale.  
Finally, the political economy of clean energy will be advanced to 
the extent that clean energy can be pursued independently from 
climate change. Climate change is threatening in no small part 
 
2010) (discussing the strategy for dramatically reducing greenhouse 
gases in Europe over the coming decades). 
54. Mark Scott, How Italy Beat the World to a Smarter Grid, Bloomberg 
Businessweek, Nov. 16, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/ 
content/nov2009/gb20091116_319929.htm (“Some 85% of Italian homes 
are now outfitted with smart meter—the highest percentage in the 
world and more such devices than exist in the whole of the U.S.”). 
55. Nuclear Power in Germany, World Nuclear Association, http:// 
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Germany (last 
updated Mar. 2013) (“A coalition government formed after the 1998 
federal elections had the phasing out of nuclear energy as a feature of its 
policy. With a new government in 2009, the phase-out was cancelled, 
but then reintroduced in 2011, with eight reactors shut down 
immediately.”). 
56. Solidiance, China's Renewable Energy Sector: An Overview of 
Key Growth Sectors 6 (2013), available at http://www.solidiance 
.com/whitepaper/china-renewable.pdf (“China’s demand for energy as 
well as its capabilities and capacity for energy production are now 
positioning China to seize the opportunity to take the lead in the 
development of sustainable energy technologies, so as to further cement 
its position as an international leader in renewable energies.”). 
57. Vikas Bajaj, India’s Investment in the Sun, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2011, 
at B1.  
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because it appears to require notable changes in lifestyle and, perhaps, 
in quality of life. Whether these threats are true or not is beside the 
point. Public opinion sometimes fears climate change in ways that it 
does not fear clean energy. Currently, clean energy can remain 
“invisible” and, therefore, can be seen as more politically benign. 
Similarly, transitioning to a clean energy economy does not appear as 
daunting as responding to climate change. Compared with climate 
change, clean energy science and technologies are simpler. Clean 
energy initiatives can be implemented on shorter time frames. Clean 
energy consumer education can be done expeditiously and more 
intelligibly and clean energy consumers can more quickly see results. 
And producers have more reliable markets. Consequently, jobs, 
investments, and markets can likewise develop quicker than more 
complex climate change efforts.58 
IV. Natural Gas and the Energy Portfolio 
For over fifty years, the U.S. energy economy was stable and 
predictable, even if problematic. From 1949 until about 2005, U.S. 
energy exports were flat, but imports, particularly of petroleum, 
continued to rise, and production and consumption largely grew in 
tandem.59 In 1970, as domestic oil production peaked, consumption 
and production began to separate from each other.60 Domestic produc-
tion could not keep pace with consumption and, as a consequence, we 
grew more dependent on foreign energy resources, especially OPEC 
oil.61 In addition, fossil fuels dominated our energy economy, with 
renewable resources barely scratching 2–3% of total U.S. energy 
production until recently.62 
Dramatic changes began to occur around 2005. Production and 
consumption grew closer together, exports increased, and imports 
decreased.63 Further, on the domestic production side, we began to 
experience a decline in coal production, an increase in natural gas and 
crude oil production, the flattening of nuclear power, and an uptick in 
 
58. Cf. Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, In Brief: Clean 
Energy Markets: Jobs and Opportunities 1 (July 2011), available 
at http://www.c2es.org/publications/brief-clean-energy-markets-jobs-and-
opportunities (estimating global investments of approximately $2.3 trillion 
over the next decade, with corresponding job creation). 
59. Annual Energy Review 2011, supra note 39, at 118–19. 
60. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Annual 
Energy Outlook 2012, at 3 (2012). 
61. Tomain, The Dominant Model, supra note 49, at 373. 
62. Annual Energy Review 2011, supra note 39, at 278–79. 
63. Annual Energy Outlook 2012, supra note 60, at 3.  
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energy produced by renewable resources.64 Correspondingly, on the 
consumption side, also from the middle of the last decade, we 
experienced declines in oil and coal consumption and increases in 
natural gas and renewable resource consumption.65  
Aside from a notable, and recent, increase in wind power 
production,66 no other resource has had as notable a turnaround as 
natural gas. Natural gas production in the United States has increased 
dramatically in recent years, rising from approximately 16 trillion 
cubic feet (tcf) in 1990 to over 22 tcf in 2010, with projections rising 
to in excess of 27 tcf by 2035.67 Those projections indicate that the 
United States has over 100 years of natural gas at current levels of 
consumption,68 although such estimates are contestable.69 Shale gas is 
largely responsible for this trend, increasing from approximately 1.3 
tcf in 2007, to in excess of 5.3 tcf in 2010,70 while accounting for 
nearly half of all projected domestic natural gas production by 2035.71 
As a consequence, the United States is expected to go from a net 
importer of 11% of our natural gas needs in 2010 to a net exporter of 
5% by 2035.72 
Natural gas currently plays a large role in the U.S. energy 
portfolio, providing 25% of our electric power generation, 30% of the 
feedstock consumed in the industrial sector, and heating 56 million 
homes.73 What is notable about natural gas is that it transcends the 
traditional energy divide between the transportation and electricity 
sectors and serves a diversity of end users. Virtually no oil is used to 
generate electricity74 and virtually no electricity is used to power cars 
 
64. Annual Energy Review 2011, supra note 39, at 6. 
65. Annual Energy Outlook 2012, supra note 60, at 3–9. 
66. Id. at 75. 
67. Id. at 92. 
68. Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., Shale Gas: New Opportunities, New 
Challenges 5 (Jan. 2012). 
69. See Peter Behr, Natural Gas: ‘There is No Way to Tell’ How Much Gas 
the U.S. Can Produce, Energywire (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www. 
eenews.net/energywire/2013/02/11/1 (explaining that current shale pro-
duction projections are based on computer modeling that extrapolates 
data on a number of variables, resulting in a large variance in possible 
outcomes).  
70. Shale Gas Production, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia. 
gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_shalegas_s1_a.htm (last visited May 13, 2013) 
(providing a useful spreadsheet tracking shale gas production by state). 
71. Annual Energy Outlook 2012, supra note 60, at 93. 
72. Id. at 92. 
73. Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., supra note 68, at 5. 
74. See Annual Energy Outlook 2012, supra note 60, at 48–50.  
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(although that is changing).75 Natural gas, by way of contrast, is 
currently used, and is expanding its use, in both sectors.76 
Additionally, combined-cycle natural gas can significantly improve the 
use of intermittent power producers such as solar and, therefore, 
facilitate the integration of solar power into the grid.77 
With such notable growth come economic and environmental 
benefits. The role of natural gas in our energy portfolio has increased 
to about 30%, almost exclusively in the electricity sector. Consist-
ently, coal-fired electricity has declined from over 50% to 42% of 
power production in recent years,78 while only one new coal plant has 
been constructed during the same time period.79 Indeed, old coal 
plants are retiring and new projects are facing closer scrutiny by state 
regulators.80 Experts project that by 2016 approximately 10% of 
installed capacity of coal plants will be retired.81  
The even better news is job creation. An industry-sponsored study 
reports that by 2035, shale gas production alone will account for up to 
1.6 million jobs—having increased from 601,348 in 2010—and a total 
economic value of $231 billion, up from $76 billion in 2010.82 Further, 
shale gas will buoy the manufacturing sector by lowering energy costs 
and raising investment in the chemical, metal, and other industries.83 
The increase in manufacturing and job creation directly leads to 
increased tax revenues for the local, state, and federal governments.84  
 
75. Id. at 30–35. 
76. Id. at 84–89. 
77. See Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., supra note 68, at 11 (referencing a 
“hybrid” plant that alternates between solar-generated steam and 
natural gas, resulting in a cost savings of 20 percent). 
78. Annual Energy Outlook 2012, supra note 60, at 87. 
79. See Herbert Wheary, Defying the Odds: Virginia Brings a New Coal-
Fired Plant Online, Pub. Util. Fort., Dec. 2012, at 30 (describing the 
factors that led to a new plant’s completion in the face of mounting 
environmental regulations). 
80. See Melissa Powers, The Cost of Coal: Climate Change and the End of 
Coal as a Source of “Cheap” Electricity, 12 U. Penn. J. Bus. L. 407, 
424–32 (2010) (explaining that states have been reluctant to permit 
construction of new coal plants due to the risk of dramatically increased 
utility rates that might result from potential national climate legislation).  
81. Metin Celebi et al., Brattle Grp., Potential Coal Plant 
Retirements: 2012 Update, at 1 (2012).  
82. IHS Global Insight, The Economic and Employment Contributions 
of Shale Gas in the United States 1 (2011). 
83. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, Shale Gas: A Renaissance in 
US Manufacturing? 1 (2011).  
84. IHS Global Insight, supra note 82, at 2.  
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From the environmental perspective, carbon emissions have been 
declining and are expected to continue to do so. It has been estimated 
that by replacing coal with natural gas, we can reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from electricity generation by 45%, with attendant improve-
ments in health.85 There are several reasons for this development. Some 
of the decline is attributable to a weak economy during the Great 
Recession and a corresponding reduction in energy demand. Further, 
the increase in wind power, the decrease in coal-fired electricity, the 
increased use of natural gas, and increased fuel economy standards all 
led the Department of Energy to reduce its most recent 2013 emissions 
projections by roughly 30% from 2006 estimates.86  
Thus, there are several good news items on the fossil fuel front, 
but we cannot ignore the multiple challenges presented by shale gas 
development. 
V. Environmental Challenges  
Historically, natural gas production has been a byproduct of oil 
production. Oil producing states such as Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, 
and California have had long experience regulating both natural 
resources. But today shale gas formations are occurring in a wider 
array of states such as Arkansas, Colorado, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New 
York, and West Virginia—as well as Texas and Louisiana. Several of 
the newcomer states are not familiar with natural gas regulation and 
some, such as New York, Maryland, and New Jersey, have adopted 
moratoria on shale gas production in order to better understand the 
exploration and exploitation of this natural resource.87 These states, 
reasonably enough, are concerned primarily about the environmental 
consequences of increased natural gas production.  
The United States has been producing natural gas for over a 
century. Domestic shale gas production, however, presents new 
challenges. Shale gas production has increased twelvefold over the last 
decade and now comprises approximately 25% of our total domestic 
natural gas yield.88 Further, the success of shale gas production is 
directly attributable to horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, 
which are used in approximately two-thirds of the natural gas wells in 
the United States and up to 95% of all oil and gas wells currently being 
 
85. Pierce, supra note 4 (manuscript at 5). 
86. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., AEO2013 Early Release Overview 
12–13 (2012) (comparing emissions projections from 2006 report to 
those projected in 2013).  
87. Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., supra note 68, at 4. 
88. Id. at 13. 
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drilled.89 Fracturing has received a significant amount of attention, 
most notably for the possible environmental harms that attend that 
production process. 
A. Air Pollution 
Shale gas drilling operations can cause air pollution from a 
number of sources. Diesel engines, rigs, trucks, and other equipment 
emit greenhouse gases. Additionally, gases are released from operating 
the wells themselves, especially through venting and flaring. The gas 
production process and the various activities associated with it 
“combine to release large amounts of methane, fine particulate matter 
and VOCs. VOCs are ground level ozone precursors, and methane is a 
highly [toxic] greenhouse gas.”90 Gas leakage from all of these 
activities has the potential for environmental harms.91 It is significant 
that, while natural gas has a lower carbon content than coal, most 
estimates of carbon emissions do not take into account production 
activities, which, given estimates of increased shale gas production, 
simply raise the importance of the air pollution caused by hydraulic 
fracturing.92 
Methane, a component of natural gas, gives the greatest cause for 
concern. Although the amount of methane emissions are much lower 
than the emissions of carbon dioxide, methane is seventy-two times 
more potent than carbon dioxide at the time of release and is twenty-
five times more potent over a 100 year period.93 Consequently, as oil 
 
89. Nat’l Petroleum Council, Prudent Development: Realizing the 
Potential of North America’s Abundant Natural Gas and Oil 
Resources 21 (2011), available at http://www.npc.org/reports/rd.html.  
90. Beren Argetsinger, Comment, The Marcellus Shale: Bridge to a Clean 
Energy Future or Bridge to Nowhere? Environmental, Energy and 
Climate Policy Considerations for Shale Gas Development in New York 
State, 29 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 321, 336 (2011) (citation omitted). 
91. Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. 
Colo L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 67–70), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017104 (“Both new and spent drilling fluids 
and muds can spill when transferred between pits or tanks and the well. 
Further, oil or gas-containing substances produced from the well may 
spill from the wellhead or storage tanks and pollute the site or nearby 
areas.” (internal citation omitted)). 
92. Argetsinger, supra note 90, at 337–38. See also Donald McCubbin & 
Benjamin K. Sovacool, Quantifying the Health and Environmental 
Benefits of Wind Power to Natural Gas, 53 Energy Pol’y 429 (2013) 
(noting the lower carbon emissions from wind compared to shale gas). 
93. See Eric Pooley, Envtl. Def. Fund, Natural Gas—A Briefing 
Paper for Candidates 5–6 (Aug. 10, 2012), available at http:// 
blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2012/08/10/natural-gas-a-briefing-paper-for-
candidates (discussing the impact of natural gas leakage on climate 
change).  
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and gas exploration and production expand, methane leakage can 
occur throughout the development of those resources from extraction 
to transportation, storage, and delivery. To date, the EPA has failed 
to regulate methane even as it has adopted new rules for oil and gas 
producers,94 even though a Department of Energy advisory committee 
recommended that “[m]easures should be taken to reduce emission of 
air pollutants, ozone precursors, and methane as quickly as 
practicable.”95 In short, methane needs to be monitored, regulated, 
and where it can be, captured. Indeed, methane capture itself has 
economic value by increasing producer profits and royalties.96  
Still, the hydraulic fracturing process can involve methane 
seepage either into the air or into aquifers.97 After a well is drilled, it 
must be encased. Then, either during the fracturing process or after a 
well has run its course, well integrity can become compromised, 
resulting in leakage. There is evidence that improper drilling activity 
or inadequate well encasing can increase the risk of air contamination 
due to methane leakage. Unsurprisingly, regulators and industry types 
testify “that fracturing has never caused contamination,” while those 
opposed to fracturing “list dozens of likely contamination events.”98 In 
either case, caution is advisable and monitoring and improving 
drilling techniques is prudent. 
Recent studies suggest that the immediate impact of shale gas 
production on greenhouse gas emissions, including methane, may not 
be as dire as some predictions suggest. One study concludes that 
while increased efforts at emissions reductions are both warranted and 
possible, “it is also clear is that the production of shale gas and 
specifically, the associated hydraulic fracturing operations have not 
materially altered the total [greenhouse gas] emissions from the 
 
94. See, e.g., David McCabe, Clean Air Task Force, EPA’s New 
Standards for Oil & Gas: What They Do, and Don’t Do 1–2 
(2012), available at http://www.catf.us/resources/filings/oil_and_gas 
(describing the emission reduction measures in the EPA’s new standards 
and remaining gaps in the rules). 
95. Sec’y of Energy Advisory Bd., Shale Gas Production 
Subcommittee Second Ninety Day Report 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov. 
96. See Susan Harvey et al., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Leaking 
Profits: The U.S. Oil and Gas Industry Can Reduce Pollution, 
Conserve Resources, and Make Money by Preventing Methane 
Waste 3 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.nrdc.org/documents.asp 
?topicid=12 (noting the economic and environmental benefits of curbing 
methane leakage).  
97. See Wiseman, supra note 91 (manuscript at 49–56) (discussing the  risks 
of methane leakage and the state regulatory response). 
98. Id. (manuscript at 52). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Shale Gas and Clean Energy Policy 
1207 
natural gas sector.”99 And another study concludes that under 
appropriate scenarios, methane leakages are “modest.”100 
Like any discussion of a complex policy matter, the devil is in the 
details. There are studies indicating that methane leakage from natural 
gas production can have negative greenhouse gas effects.101 These 
studies indicate that a transition from coal to natural gas actually could 
reduce or negate the climate benefits of lower carbon dioxide emissions. 
The trick in the studies resides, of course, in the assumptions. In the 
short term, as natural gas replaces coal in the electricity sector, CO2 
reductions will take place. When analyzing the long-term effects of 
increased natural gas production, the issue becomes twofold. First, 
what is the target number regarding CO2 in the atmosphere? Is it 450 
ppm or 550 ppm, by way of example? Second, how long should we 
envision natural gas serving as a “bridge fuel?” The point simply is that 
methane leakage presents an environmental risk, and that risk increases 
the longer the duration for the use of natural gas in our energy 
portfolio. Precisely because natural gas does emit greenhouse gases 
including the toxic methane, and even though it can replace coal-fired 
power production, we cannot rely on this long term if the goal is to 
transition to a clean energy future. 
B. Water Pollution 
Water is a significant input into the hydraulic fracturing process. 
Consequently, several water issues emerge. First, drilling requires 
large volumes of water to be withdrawn from both ground and surface 
waters.102 Second, during drilling, various chemicals are mixed into the 
 
99. Francis O’Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, Shale Gas Production: Potential 
Versus Actual Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 7 Envtl. Res. Letters No. 
044030, at 1, 5 (2012), available at http://globalchange.mit.edu/research/ 
publications/2368. 
100. Michael Levi, Climate Consequences of Natural Gas as a Bridge Fuel, 
Climatic Change (Jan. 3, 2013), http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/ 
10.1007%2Fs10584-012-0658-3. 
101. See, e.g., Tom M.L. Wigley, Coal to Gas: The Influence of Methane 
Leakage, 108 Climatic Change 601, 607 (2011) (finding that replacing 
coal with natural gas “results in increased rather than decreased global 
warming” due to methane leakage); Robert W. Howarth, Renee Santoro 
& Anthony Ingraffea, Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of 
Natural Gas from Shale Formations: A Letter, 106 Climatic Change 
679, 688 (2011) (“[S]ubstituting shale gas for these other fossil fuels may 
not have the desired effect of mitigating climate warming.”). 
102. Rebecca Hammer & Jeanne VanBriesen, Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, In Fracking’s Wake: New Rules are Needed to 
Protect Our Health and Environment from Contaminated 
Wastewater 11 (2012) (contaminated “flowback” and “produced 
water” may “reach into the millions of gallons” over the lifetime of a 
shale gas well). 
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water, and consequent surface spills can affect drinking water 
resources.103 Third, well injection also has an impact on drinking 
water resources.104 Fourth, wastewater must be transported and stored 
and spillage from either process can also have health effects.105 And, 
finally, wastewater needs to be treated and disposed, and this can 
impact drinking water resources.106 The Environmental Protection 
Agency was directed by Congress to study and review the effect of 
hydraulic fracturing on drinking water resources.107 In December 2012, 
the EPA issued a progress report on its study.108  
The EPA study is a result of eighteen research projects as well as 
data collected directly from both the oil and natural gas industries as 
well as from states with high levels of oil and gas activity.109 
Additionally, the EPA analyzed data from FracFocus, which is a 
national hydraulic fracturing chemical registry operated by the 
Groundwater Protection Council and the Interstate Oil and Gas 
Compact Commission110 and is funded by two fossil fuel lobbying 
groups: the American Petroleum Institute and America’s Natural Gas 
Alliance.111 The EPA is also conducting laboratory research and is 
engaging in consultation with other federal state and interstate 
agencies, industry, nongovernmental organizations, and other 
stakeholders. It is the goal of the EPA to inform the public and 
provide decision makers at all levels of high-quality scientific 
information to be used in the decision-making process. In short, the 
EPA progress report details the steps the agency is taking to satisfy 
its charge from Congress. Although the administration has not issued 
 
103. Id. at 1 (discussing the attendant dangers of “flowback” and “produced 
water” as wastewater by-products of hydrofracking). 
104. Id. at 6 (discussing the risk of contaminating groundwater when wastes 
are injected into Class II disposal wells). 
105. Id. (discussing the risk of “accidental release” anywhere wastewater is 
handled).  
106. Id. (discussing the risks of discharging inadequately treated waste water 
and the creation of residuals following treatment).  
107. H.R. Rep. No. 111-316, at 109 (2009) (Conf. Rep.). 
108. EPA, Study of the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing 
on Drinking Water Resources: Progress Report (2012). 
109. Id. at 1–2. 
110. Id. at 54–61; FracFocus: Chemical Disclosure Registry, 
http://fracfocus.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).  
111. See Mike Soraghan & Ellen M. Gilmer, Hydraulic Fracturing: Revised 
Interior Rule Loops in Industry-Favored FracFocus, Energywire (Feb. 
8, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2013/02/08/1 (dis-
cussing a new rule promulgated by the Department of the Interior 
allowing companies to report chemicals used in fracturing through 
FracFocus’s database).  
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its final report and continues its work, its plan of action is instructive. 
The EPA will examine the several uses of water used in the hydraulic 
fracturing process as well as undertake a detailed analysis of the 
chemicals used and their effects on drinking water.112 
Initial discussions on drinking water suggest that hydraulic 
fracturing will have minimal impact on freshwater aquifers “because 
fracturing typically takes place at a depth of 6,000 to 10,000 feet, 
while drinking water tables are typically less than 1,000 feet deep.”113 
The average well requires from three to five million gallons of water 
for drilling and hydraulic fracturing. While these withdrawals are 
significant, they involve significantly less water than that used for 
nuclear or coal power generation. To the extent that shale formations 
are developed in the eastern United States, this amount of water 
withdrawal is manageable. Further, producers can use water recycling 
to reduce the total amount of consumption as well as potential 
environmental impact.114 
Nevertheless, more recent developments on the use of water, its 
pollution, and possible human health effects are disturbing. The New 
York State Department of Environmental Conservation, for example, 
estimates that each well “requires anywhere from 2.9 million to 7.8 
million gallons of injected water,” not to mention all the additional 
chemicals in that water.115 That agency also reports that over the next 
thirty years there could be up to 40,000 wells developed through 
hydraulic fracturing technologies thus indicating a significant increase 
in water withdrawal.116  
More problematically, water that is injected into a well will flow 
back. Anywhere from 10 to 50% of the injected water can be returned 
to the surface, and that flowback water contains chemicals used 
 
112. EPA, supra note 108, at 163–71 (providing a summary of research 
progress and next steps). 
113. Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., supra note 68, at 13; see also Scott Kell, 
Ground Water Prot. Council, State Oil and Gas Agency 
Groundwater Investigations and their Role in Advancing 
Regulatory Reforms: A Two-State Review: Ohio and Texas 
102 (2011) (noting that neither Ohio nor Texas has a single documented 
incident of groundwater contamination from hydraulic fracturing). 
114. See Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., supra note 68, at 14 (discussing the 
potential effects of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water resources). 
115. See Argetsinger, supra note 90, at 331 (citing N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Envtl. Conservation, Revised Draft: Supplemental Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement on the Oil, Gas and 
Solution Mining Regulatory Program 8 (2011)). 
116. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, supra note 115, 
§ 6.1.1.7, at 6-6. 
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during the fracturing operation.117 Wastewater chemicals are often 
toxic, including organic pollutants, heavy metals, and radioactive 
materials, some of which are naturally occurring.118 Industry has been 
reluctant to fully disclose the chemical composition of wastewater, 
thus hiding risks to environmental health.119 
Consequently, these chemically tainted waters must be managed 
and treated properly. One regulatory option is to require disclosure of 
the exact composition of the chemical fluids used in the process.120 
Many producers have self-reported and use the public website 
FracFocus to disclose volumes as well as the chemical makeup of the 
fluids. In most shale regions, the flowback and produced water can be 
disposed of by injection into deep geologic formations. But in some 
regions, most notably in the Marcellus Shale, those formations are 
limited. Consequently, in such regions, flowback must be treated, 
recycled, disposed of, or delivered to water treatment facilities.121 
Unfortunately, the EPA, pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 
2005,122 is prohibited from regulating hydraulic fracturing operations 
under the Safe Drinking Water Act.123 This gaping loophole is known as 
the “Halliburton exception” named for the oil and gas industry firm 
that lobbied for it and patented hydraulic fracturing in the 1940s.124 
 
117. See O’Sullivan & Paltsev, supra note 99, at 2 (detailing the flowback 
process). 
118. See Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, Drilling for Natural Gas in 
the Marcellus and Utica Shales: Environmental Regulatory 
Basics 3 (2012) (describing the environmental concerns related to 
drilling). 
119. See Argetsinger, supra note 90, at 332–36 (discussing the difficulty in 
gauging the risks posed by chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing due to 
industry nondisclosure and lax federal environmental regulations). 
120. See Wiseman, supra note 91 (manuscript at 34–35) (discussing the pros 
and cons of disclosure). 
121. See O’Sullivan & Paltsev, supra note 99, at 2 (analyzing potential gas 
emissions produced during well flowback). 
122. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 117 Stat. 594 (2005).  
123. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1) (2006). 
124. See Jeffrey D. Dintzer & Elizabeth M. Burnside, Law360, Take 
It Easy on Fracking (2011), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/ 
publications/Documents/DintzerBurnside-TakeItEasyOnFracking.pdf 
(noting that while an initial EPA report found no threat to groundwater 
from hydraulic fracturing, the EPA is currently conducting a revised 
study); Amy Tiemann, Why You Need to Know About Fracking—It 
May be Coming to a Field or Neighborhood Near You (Oct. 8, 2011), 
http://amytiemann.com/tag/halliburton-exception (discussing the 
insufficient federal and state regulation of hydraulic fracturing); The 
Halliburton Loophole, Earthworks, http://www.earthworksaction.org/ 
issues/detail/inadequate_regulation_of_hydraulic_fracturing (last visited 
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Fortunately, the EPA has initiated a rulemaking to set water discharge 
standards for wastewater from shale gas production.125 Additionally, 
industry environmental groups and state regulators have devised a 
program to develop, under the acronym STRONGER, “guidelines for 
better management and disposal of oil and gas wastes.”126  
Thus, water use involves several environmental issues including 
the amount used during injection and the possible environmental and 
human health effects that can result from the effects of the use of 
chemicals in the process. Noted risks include the introduction of 
invasive species between water resources, increased surface water 
temperatures, increased pollutant concentrations, harmful water 
plants and wildlife, and reduced water quality for all users. These 
effects will vary depending upon levels of toxicity, how the chemicals 
are introduced into the environment, and the routes by which 
humans, wildlife, and plant life are exposed to them, including 
chemical spills.127 
C. Community Disruption 
As noted above, shale gas development is occurring in regions, 
particularly in the eastern United States, that are unfamiliar with oil 
and gas exploration and production. Developing sites require the use 
of trucks and other heavy equipment, as well as the possible 
construction of new roads, drill pads, and gathering lines. These 
activities affect the immediate area and effect air emissions, odors, 
noise, spill risk, land use, wildlife, and the general life styles of these 
communities. 
The shale gas boom has seen a significant increase in drilling 
activity. More wells are being drilled, and with that increase there is a 
greater need for more surface usage. Operators need more access 
roads; habitats are disturbed; transportation activity increases 
dramatically; soil erosion occurs; and storm water quality is adversely 
 
Feb. 23, 2013) (detailing efforts by Congress and local governments to 
close the Halliburton Loophole).  
125. See EPA, EPA Initiates Rulemaking to Set Discharge 
Standards for Wastewater from Shale Gas Extraction (2011) 
(discussing EPA efforts to research and reevaluate the treatment of 
shale gas wastewater).  
126. Wiseman, supra note 91 (manuscript at 41). STRONGER is the State 
Review of Oil & Natural Gas Environmental Regulations initiated by 
the EPA. Id. (manuscript at 40); see also Regulatory Determination for 
Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration, Development and Production 
Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,445, 25,456–57 (July 6, 1988) (noting the 
development of a review system for the adequacy of state regulations).  
127. See Wiseman, supra note 91 (manuscript at 29–31) (describing the 
composition and dangers of fracturing chemicals and the impact of 
chemical spills). 
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affected.128 In addition to growing conflicts between local, state, and 
federal authorities regarding the extent of hydraulic fracturing and its 
regulation, conflicts about the use of and disruption to public lands 
are also increasing.129 
VI. Recommendations 
Given the potential environmental consequences of hydraulic 
fracturing, there is no shortage of recommendations regarding this 
drilling process. At the federal level, the EPA continues to research 
the consequences of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water. 
Additionally, the Bureau of Land Management has proposed a rule to 
regulate fracturing on public and Indian lands. This rule would 
require disclosure of chemicals used throughout the drilling process, 
attempt to improve the well-bore integrity, and address issues on 
flow-back waters.130 
Additionally, federal regulators should reconsider both the 
Halliburton exemption and the exemption of fracking under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Further, Congress has had 
legislation introduced, known as the “Fracturing Responsibility and 
Awareness of Chemicals Act,” that promotes public disclosure.131 
Indeed, national regulations have the advantage of making fracking 
regulation even across state boundaries, and that uniformity should 
benefit the industry as it will not have to comply with multiple state 
regulatory schemes.132  
Professor Hannah Wiseman has written an important analysis of 
shale gas production and the environmental concerns generated by its 
rapid growth.133 Equally important are the recommendations that she 
makes. Her paper is premised on the idea that the most pressing risks 
 
128. See id. (manuscript at 62–70) (discussing the challenges presented by 
the construction of well pads and access roads and potential solutions). 
129. See, e.g., Jack Healy, Colorado Communities Take on Fight Against 
Energy Land Leases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2013, at 15 (noting the 
opposition of local residents in Colorado to opening up federal land for 
oil and natural gas drilling). 
130. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on 
Federal and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (proposed May 11, 2012) 
(to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160). 
131. See David Spence, Energy Mgmt. and Info. Ctr., Fracking 
Regulations: Is Federal Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation 
Around the Corner? (2010) (describing the federal government’s 
recent attempts to regulate hydraulic fracturing).  
132. Cf. Jody Freeman, The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling, N.Y. 
Times, July 6, 2012, at A23 (arguing for federal baseline standards for 
the regulation of hydraulic fracturing). 
133. Wiseman, supra note 91. 
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may not arise from the injection of chemicals and water into wells, 
but from other stages of the natural gas development process, 
including a higher rate of well drilling.134 Additionally, given the 
magnitude of gas production operations, risks are introduced 
throughout the process. Spills, transportation, storage, and disposal of 
wastewater must also be given attention.135 
From her analysis of identified risks and regulatory innovations 
that have been occurring in several states, she provides a list of ten 
regulations that states should consider including: 
•detailed spill prevention and response plans for all oil and gas 
sites; 
•ensure that surface water withdrawals do not reduce in-
stream flow below levels needed to support aquatic life; 
•use closed-loop tanks for storage drilling in fracturing wastes; 
•increased setbacks between well pads and natural resources; 
•require that wastewater treatment plants provide evidence 
that they can treat flowback water; 
•adopt requirements for preventing well leakage; 
•encourage or require the reuse of flow-back water; 
•prohibit the use of used well casings; 
•require well operators to pressure test the wells before 
fracturing up to maximum pressure and use blowout 
prevention equipment; 
•adopt a rebuttable presumption that methane contamination 
within a certain distance from drilling operations can occur 
within a certain time drilling; and 
•require air emissions monitoring and reporting.136 
Professor Wiseman notes that these recommendations are directed to 
state regulators.137 Therefore, there are a range of possible regulatory 
activities and the appropriate level of governance must also be 
addressed.138 
 
134. Id. (manuscript at 8–10). 
135. Id. (manuscript at 23–47). 
136. Id. (manuscript at 77–78). 
137. Id. (manuscript at 77). 
138. Regarding the appropriate level of governance, that is, whether the 
federal government or the states should have primary jurisdiction, 
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Conclusion 
From the above analysis, I conclude that natural gas, particularly 
shale gas, should not be included in the definition of clean energy. For 
all its environmental improvements and economic benefits, shale gas 
continues our traditional fossil fuel energy model. For most of the 
twentieth century that model yielded great benefits, including a 
robust economy and the construction of a national infrastructure, and 
it served as the backbone of U.S. world leadership, particularly during 
the two world wars. 
But that model benefited from a series of government supports, 
including tax breaks and other subsidies; under enforcement of 
royalty, environmental, and safety obligations; and an energy 
bureaucracy that has played an intentionally supportive role that has 
buoyed domestic oil and gas producers to phenomenal levels of 
wealth.139 In short, the playing field between fossil fuels and clean 
energy is not level regardless of the increasing, but too often episodic, 
financial supports afforded new and cleaner technologies.140 
 
compare David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the 
Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431 
(2013) (arguing for narrow federal regulation), with Michael Burger, 
Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA L. Rev. Online 150 
(2013), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/02-2013/Burger.pdf (con-
tending that greater federal regulation is necessary).  
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the company’s political influence). The company’s second quarter profits 
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2012, 10:50 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/26/news/companies/ 
exxon-profit/index.htm (noting that given the decline in oil and gas 
prices, Exxon’s record profits were largely due to the divestment of 
foreign operations).  
140. See Cong. Budget Off., Federal Financial Support for the 
Development and Production of Fuels and Energy 
Technologies (Mar. 2012) (detailing the tax preferences and direct 
government investments for fuel and energy technologies). According to 
the CBO study, in 2011 energy efficiency and renewable resources 
received 78% of the energy-related tax preferences. Id. at 5. But the tax 
code contains only four permanent tax breaks, and three go to fossil 
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Today, the natural gas industry is highly competitive as prices 
continue to fall, sometimes to the dismay of gas exploration 
companies and those that finance them.141 But the fact that some 
explorers cannot turn a profit is indicative of competition rather than 
a market failure. Neither oil nor gas producers need the helping hand 
of government. Additionally, as natural gas displaces coal for 
electricity generation, we will witness a lowering of carbon dioxide 
emissions, particularly as natural gas continues to serve that sector. 
In short, we are substituting a cleaner burning fuel in the electric 
sector but we are not using a clean fuel. If the clean energy transition 
is to be successful, then the United States, and indeed the world, 
must move away from fossil fuels. In the United States, we can 
improve national security, reduce economic threats, and reduce 
environmental degradation through clean energy. We must continue a 
commitment to a clean transition by expanding the use of renewal 
resources and energy efficiencies. Shale gas plays no role in that 
picture. 
By concentrating on natural gas development we run the risk of 
diminishing the importance of our concentration on clean energy 
activities.142 As a realist, I recognize that natural gas will play a large 
role in our energy economy. Further, I do not dismiss its positive 
environmental and economic benefits. Nevertheless, even though 
natural gas has been a major component of our hydrocarbon economy 
and even though it will continue to play significant role, as a matter 
of a sound future energy policy, we cannot allow it to distract us from 
a more important and economically promising clean energy future. 
 
141. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss & Eric Lipton, After the Boom in Natural 
Gas, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 2012, at BU1 (noting that a market surplus 
and low prices have led to financial hardship for natural gas companies). 
142. See John Broder, After Federal Jolt, Clean Energy Seeks New Spark, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2012, at F2 (noting the lack of funding for 
alternative energy investments as federal stimulus money runs out). 
  
 
   
